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Abstruct 
Lithium is a key global resource of efficient 
batteries used in electronic devices (ex. smart 
phone, electric car, etc.). But its booming demand 
threatens to contaminate one of the world’s great 
wonders, the Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia, which 
holds 70% of the world’s lithium reserves. The 
present government of Bolivia wants to extract 
lithium and to create the processing industry with-
in Bolivia. However the plans lack a conscious-
ness about social and environmental costs. The 
water scarcity around the Salar de Uyuni being 
ignored, the high water consumption of lithium 
plant would deprive indigenous communities of 
their traditional income measures: quinoa and pas-
toral farming. In addition, with little concern for 
the environmental effects of using toxic materials, 
widespread pollutions would put the flora and fau-
na at risk. Destroying the people’s environment, 
the lithium strategy contradicts the principle of 
‘vivir bien’ (live well) and the ‘rights of mother 
earth’. 
In this paper, the environmental problematique 
of lithium extraction in Bolivia is cleared and the 
way of solving problems is suggested. 
I. Introduction 
Lost in the great Bolivian lithium race is, Hol-
lender and Shultz warn, a set of very deep and real 
environmental concerns. In the name of providing 
cleaner cars to the wealthy countries of the North 
Bolivia’s beautiful and rare Salar could end up an 
environmental wasteland. The adequacy of en-
vironmental strategy for lithium development in 
Southwest Potosí is doubted by several well-re-
garded Bolivian environmental organizations 
(Hollender et al.: 5). 
They mention that the lithium development 
could cause a major water crisis. The region al-
ready suffers from a serious water shortage, im-
pacting quinoa farmers, llama herders, the tourism 
industry, and drinking water sources. Although 
Bolivian officials contend that the lithium pro-
jectfs water requirements will be minimal, their 
estimates are based on very limited and incom-
plete information (Hollender et al. 2010: 5–6).
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Contamination of the air, water and soil is also 
a major concern. A large quantity of toxic chemi-
cals, they add, will be needed to process the pre-
dicted 30,000 to 40,000 tons of lithium per year. 
The escape of such chemicals via leaching, spills, 
or air emissions is a danger that threatens the com-
munities and the ecosystem. Bolivian officials 
have dismissed those risks, and the government 
system to protect the environment is inadequate. 
Public institutions, such as the Ministry of En-
vironment and Water, which are responsible for 
ensuring compliance with environmental require-
ments, clearly lack the capacity or authority to in-
tervene in effective way (Hollender et al.: 6).
In short, the possible environmental impacts 
of lithium development are too wretched. Howev-
er, thus far, the government is not paying sufficient 
attention to these risks. We should take these risks 
seriously, especially for future generations.
II. Far-reaching Ill-effects of Lithium 
Mining: Crisis of Intact Water System 
1. Quinoa cultivation and pasture farming
The cultivation and exportation of quinoa is 
a far more sustainable income strategy than the 
export of lithium. Nowadays quinoa has about 
the same world market price as lithium (6€/kg), 
but it is renewable resource which can be grown 
for a time that lasts much longer than the typical 
resource exportation cycles. According to official 
estimations by the lithium-extraction in the Salar 
de Uyuni only 700–1500 jobs will be created. But 
more than 13,000 families are currently producing 
quinoa (Hollender et al.: 46; Poma et al.: 13). Fur-
thermore in contrast to the industrial lithium car-
bonate production, it allows the local indigenous 
peasants to maintain their culture and traditional 
form of life (Anlauf: 25).
In addition, Ströbele-Gregor mentions an im-
portance of intact water system on which the other 
income strategies of the communities around the 
Salar de Uyuni depend. The second income source 
is a pasture farming. Together with the quinoa pro-
duction it is mainly used for subsistence-purposes 
and the continuation of rural family economies. 
While only 10% of the area in the south-eastern 
Potosí is used for agricultural purposes, 60% are 
used for pasture farming. The raise of camelids is 
only possible because of local wetlands and high-
land moors, which are a very fragile ecosystem 
reacting very sensible to changes in the water sys-
tem (Ströbele-Gregor: 55–56, 61–62; Hollender et 
al.: 40; Anlauf: 25).
2. Crises of intact water system, untouched 
nature and right to water
Ströbele-Gregor and Anlauf explain the crisis 
of intact water system. Traditionally, communities 
are also engaged in the extraction of salt, which 
they sell to foreign markets or they trade it directly 
for corn or other products from the near valleys. 
In recent times this traditionally diverse income 
strategy is also supplemented by temporal migra-
tion or touristic activities. But the latest income 
strategy, tourism, also highly depends on in intact 
water system. Tourists are mainly attracted by the 
spectacular colorful lagoons, which might dry out 
under the immense water needs of the industrial 
lithium carbonate production. These lagoons also 
host three species of flamingos that would not only 
die out as a tourist attraction, but also as a species 
itself in the region. The image of an ‘untouched 
nature’ that attracts most tourist will be hard to 
keep up with drillings and plants spread all over 
the salar (Ströbele-Gregor: 62, 81; Anlauf: 25–26).
Furthermore, many warn the use of toxic 
chemicals, such as hydrogen chloride (HCl) and 
potassium chloride (KCl), which are needed in 
vast amounts to produce the desired 40,000 tons 
of lithium carbonate per year: 265.300 tons of HCl 
and 250.100 tons of KCl. These toxic substanc-
es pollute the subterranean waters, which highly 
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threatens agricultural and pastoral activities in the 
region. The pilot plant itself wasn’t even tested on 
its environmental compatibility (Ströbele-Gregor: 
80; Hollender et al.: 41–42; Anlauf: 26).
Finally, Ströbele-Gregor and Anlauf insist the 
crisis of ‘right to water’. The migration of laborers 
towards the industrial lithium area makes higher 
the pressure on the resource water. As outlined 
above, the government’s plans will lead to a disap-
pearance or degradation of water sources used for 
human consumption. Already today, only 20–60% 
in rural areas and 50–70% in urban areas have ac-
cess to fresh water. For COMIBOL (Corporacíon 
Minera de Bolivia), a lithium company, the fresh 
water supply of the workers on the plants will have 
priority over the water access of the communities 
around the Salar. Thus their constitutional ‘right to 
water’ is very likely to be violated for the benefit 
of an export oriented industry (Ströbele-Gregor: 
57, 61, 81–82; Anlauuf: 26)
In short, while all the economic activities of 
the local population highly depend on water, their 
continuous existence is threatened by the much 
water consuming lithium production.
III. ‘Gold of the 21st Century’ helps lift 
Bolivia out of poverty?
1. History of colonialization and raw material 
exploitation
Doyre explains the history of colonialization 
that, although Bolivia contains the world’s largest 
lithium reserves, it is one of the poorest nations 
in South America. Due to a lack of infrastructure, 
this nation is unable to take advantage of own 
wealth of natural resources located in the remote 
area of Salar de Uyuni. Even with transnational 
corporations from France, South Korea, and Japan 
to invest in Boliviafs lithium, the administration 
of President Evo Morales has nationalized much 
of its natural resource industry, thus preventing 
many foreign companies from investing in Boliv-
ia. Although Morales has been heavily criticized 
for closing the doors to Bolivia, the justifications 
for nationalization are based on a long history of 
exploitation (Doyre: 10).
Following this, Dyre explains the exploita-
tion of raw materials in Bolivia which dates to its 
colonization by the Spanish during the sixteenth 
century. During the colonial period, the Spanish 
stripped Bolivia of its richness in natural metals 
such as gold, silver, tin, cadmium, tungsten, iron, 
lead and antimony. Hardly any of the profits from 
the extraction of these resources went to the Bo-
livian people but instead lined the pockets of im-
perialist Spain for 250 years. The social effects of 
this exploitation were extreme, including a forced 
labor system comprising of the indigenous popu-
lation. The harsh conditions of mines, specifically 
in Cerro Rico and Potosí, led to the deaths of mil-
lions of indigenous people who died extracting ore 
for their colonial masters (Doyre: 10–11).
Although the Bolivian people eventually 
gained independence from the Spanish, Doyre 
continues to explain a serious situation after in-
dependence, they fell to further exploitation by 
transnational corporations who hoped to take 
advantage of the newly independent Bolivians 
and become wealthy from the country’s natural 
resources. Since such corporations were engaged 
in extractive industries, they brought little devel-
opment or improvement to the Bolivian people, 
specifically the native populations. Transnational 
corporations thrive in poor countries like Bolivia 
because they have the power to provide industry, 
foreign exchange and jobs (Doyre: 11).
2. Lithium industry is next Potosí? Dirty busi-
ness for clean energy
Dyre explains an agony of dependence on for-
eign investment that a Bolivian-owned and -con-
trolled lithium industry could lead to the economic 
advancement the country always had the power to 
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create. The current administration of President 
Evo Morales is determined to avoid the history of 
raw material exploitation concerning to Bolivia’s 
lithium resources. In 2008, Morales broke ground 
on a lithium processing plant with the hope of 
making batteries in the next year. The Morales 
administration tapped the mining company CO-
MIBOL to run the $5.7 million state-owned plant, 
which represents a clear intention by the Bolivian 
government to nationalize the entire mining in-
dustry. Despite Morales’s intentions to make the 
Bolivian people the primary beneficiaries of their 
country’s resource wealth, the total lack of devel-
oped infrastructure requires foreign investors to 
aid in the development of a successful lithium in-
dustry (Doyre: 13).
While the Bolivian lithium industry represents 
hope for this perpetually exploited nation, Dyre 
warns expected environmental damages, it is like-
ly that lithium production will greatly interfere 
with the fragile ecosystem of the Salar. Bolivia 
will use brine beds and evaporation ponds, and 
then re-inject the remaining salt to extract the lith-
ium. This method increases the salinity of rivers, 
which the local people in this region use to irrigate 
their farms. Further environmental concern exists 
over the processing of lithium, which is most com-
monly done by mixing magnesium with lithium 
and could lead to further contamination. Finally, 
environmentalists have raised concerns about the 
unintentional combination of lithium with water, 
which results in highly corrosive lithium hydrox-
ide. This combination could likely result during 
the rainy season, when the Salar often floods. The 
fragile character of the Salar de Uyuni further ex-
acerbates the environmental concerns of lithium 
extraction. To extract enough lithium to meet even 
ten percent of global automotive demand would 
cause irreversible and widespread damage to a 
natural wonder that have taken millennia to form 
(Doyle: 13–14).
In short, the state-of-the-art lithium mining and 
its product industrialization have caused an archa-
ic and unchanged ‘theft of nature and poisoning of 
the land’ (Goyes et al.) in Bolivia. State-corporate 
initiatives and socio-economic structures profit 
from or cause the conditions leading to environ-
mental damage and over-exploitation.
IV. Political Economy and Ecology of 
Emancipation from ‘Curse’
1. Colonial extractivism and breaking Potosí 
Principle
Anlauf explains a ‘colonial extractivism’ that 
since colonial times Bolivia’s economy has 
historically evolved as a dependent, peripher-
al economy in the world system, supplying the 
economic centers with raw materials. While this 
transfer of resources is facilitated by local elites, 
who are closely allied to the core and also ben-
efit from this system, they have little interest in 
the industrialization and diversification of the 
economy that could reduce internal asymmetries 
and the structural dependence on the core. Within 
these unequal structures the labor force is high-
ly exploited and neglected any rights, justified by 
racism. Furthermore, the extractive economy ap-
propriates itself of the nature in very destructive 
forms. In the search of quick surpluses ecosystems 
are damaged for hundreds of years and the local 
population deprived of its livelihood means. These 
patterns have been described as the ‘Potosí Princi-
ple’, which largely continued after colonial times 
(Anlauf: 26–27).
Although having formally gained indepen-
dence, he continues, the Bolivian state continued 
to be a colonial one neglecting the indigenous ma-
jority participation in the political system. On the 
contrary they were the ones who kept on suffering 
the most under the extractive economy. Bolivia 
went through different export cycles of silver, tin 
and gas that were always accompanied by eco-
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nomic, political and social crises. Although in the 
mid 20th century some attempts of initiating an 
internal growth were made via the nationalization 
of hydrocarbons and tin, the policy-makers did not 
gain much more than temporal control over these 
resources (Anlauf: 27).
Finally he adds that after an intense protest-cy-
cle in 2005/2006 a new political force took over 
the power from a regime that had largely discred-
ited itself by its exclusiveness and an immense 
deepening of the extractive logic in the neoliberal 
model. With a very vivid long memory of the re-
source-deprivation and an ethicized political con-
sciousness, the MAS (MAS-IPSP: Movimento Al 
Socialimo — Instrumento Politico por la Sober-
anía de los Pueblos) promised a sovereignty over 
natural resources and an adequate participation of 
the indigenous majority in the political system. 
The new constitution of 2009, explicitly recogniz-
ing indigenous rights and establishing the princi-
ple of vivir bien, as well as the law of ‘rights of 
mother earth’, can be seen as first materialization 
of these ideas (Anlauf: 27).
2. Decolonization through lithium industrial-
ization without environmental and social 
consciousness
In contrast to earlier periods of extractivism 
in Bolivia, Anlauf explains, the MAS govern-
ment wants to the lithium to be extracted under 
complete state control. It wants to initiate an in-
dustrialization of the raw material within Bolivia 
and create a processing industry that adds value 
to the resource, mainly in the form of lithium-ion 
batteries for electric cars. It is very careful in im-
plementing these plans, at least with regard to the 
search for international financing and technology, 
which is lacking in Bolivia, as a part of the periph-
ery in the world system. These intentions clearly 
show the consciousness about historically being a 
dependent, resources-exporting and thus underde-
veloped country and represent the aim of breaking 
with these dependence structures and the Potosí 
Principle (Anlauf: 27–28).
However, he mentions a lack of environmen-
tal and social consciousness that, although the new 
constitution explicitly recognizes the right to wa-
ter and for indigenous people the right to manage 
their water systems according to their own cus-
toms, the water scarcity around the Salar de Uyuni 
is largely ignored by the lithium-strategy. The high 
water consumption of lithium plant would deprive 
the indigenous communities of their traditional in-
come measures, mainly quinoa and pastoral farm-
ing. The destruction of natural water cycles and 
the degradation of soils via using toxic chemicals 
within lithium production, will make it impossi-
ble for indigenous people around the Salar to keep 
on living in their territories. Their constitutional 
rights to a clean natural environment and the au-
tonomous gestion of indigenous territories are ne-
glected (Anlauf: 28). 
In addition, he warns that thus they will have 
to migrate to production centres or into the cities 
enlarging the masses of unqualified labour and 
those employed in the informal sector. Therefore 
by destroying the people’s environment, the lith-
ium strategy clearly contradicts the principle of 
‘vivir bien’ and the ‘rights of mother earth’, which 
are often referred to as central parts of the decolo-
nization (Anlauf: 28).
3. Environmental law and regulation in Bolivia
In principle, Hollender et al. insist, Bolivian 
law requires that all industrial project proposals 
complete a public consultation, environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) and technical proposal 
that highlight potential environmental impacts and 
how they will be mitigated. These studies must be 
submitted and approved before breaking ground. 
The technical proposal, approved by the govern-
ment for the pilot plant, does not seriously address 
pre-existing environmental problems of the region 
in its baseline study. However, according to Boliv-
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ian environmentalists, environmental assessments 
are notoriously unreliable in their scientific foun-
dations and rigorousness. Companies and the gov-
ernment view them as a bothersome formality and 
wriggle around them to get the green light for a 
project. Public institutions, such as Bolivia’s Min-
istry of Environment and Water, which are respon-
sible for ensuring compliance with environmental 
requirements, clearly lack the capacity or author-
ity to intervene in an effective way (Hollender et 
al.; 42).
They conclude that Bolivia’s environmental 
law lacks just about everything to monitor and 
enforce environmental protection for this type of 
industrial project. All this raises serious concerns 
about the environmental consequences of large-
scale lithium development in the Salar de Uyuni. 
Bolivia will likely face significant tradeoffs be-
tween drawing its lithium riches out from under 
Southwest Potosí and causing serious environ-
mental desecration of that region in the process 
(Hollender et al.: 43; Perreault)
In short, we need, first, more secure liveli-
hoods and resource rights, second, broader forms 
of participation and the democratization of deci-
sion-making processes regarding natural resourc-
es, third, alternative model of economic develop-
ment. 
V.  Transnational Mining, Global South/
North and Everlasting Environmen-
tal Exploitation
1. New perspective of ‘Southern Criminology’
Carrington et al. explain the recent develop-
ment of green criminology. The nation state focus 
of criminology has led to the relative neglect, until 
recently, the implications of borderless and trans-
national crimes such as environmental crimes. 
However, there is a growing tradition of green 
criminology attempting to correct this neglect. 
Notwithstanding its growing interest in crimes 
against environment, criminology devotes little 
attention to global environmental and corporate 
harms whose incidences and impacts are greatest 
in the global South, such as those associated with 
resource extraction, climate change and economic 
exploitation. Where globalization has been a foci 
of criminological theorizing, it has too readily 
assumed the simple extension of Northern trends 
across the globe, failing to do justice to global di-
versity in sources and trajectories of economic, 
social and penal policy (Carrington et al.; 4)
They insist the importance of Global South/ 
North perspective that the selective popular, of-
ficial and criminological gaze which settles on 
the crimes of the socially excluded, overlooks/
normalizes, violence and harm elsewhere. Corrup-
tion, violence, expropriation of landowners, en-
vironmental degradation and diversion of scarce 
public resources are commonplace and mutually 
reinforcing in their harmful effects. Instead of 
their rich resource base delivering benefits to or-
dinary citizens, poverty, poor health, degraded liv-
ing conditions and conflict are perpetuated and ex-
acerbated. If stable, prosperous, democratic states 
cannot avoid corruption, cronyism, economic dis-
tortions and other symptoms of the resource curse, 
we can only ponder the vulnerability of poor and 
fragile states confronting the power of global cor-
porations (Carrington et al.: 9–10).
2. Environmental exploitation of transnational 
mining in Latin America
Alimande explains the specific activity of 
mining and its associated impacts as being fun-
damental to the constitution of Latin American 
coloniality. Indeed, the exploitation of minerals in 
the region is vital to the very genesis of moder-
nity. The historical evolution of modern mining 
is intrinsically linked to the emergence, constitu-
tion and the political vicissitudes of colonialism/
coloniality, the dark counterpart and recurrently 
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denied of the modern order. As such, we focus on 
mining in the region to understand larger political 
ecologies of socio-natural transformation. In re-
cent years, neo-liberalization was part of a wider 
economic globalization that prompted renewed 
demand for Latin Americafs minerals. Thus aggre-
gate global demand for consumer goods requiring 
mineral inputs was on the rise in certain sectors, 
notably computers and mobile phones, only en-
hanced this process with their insatiable demand 
for diverse minerals such as lithium (Alimonda: 
149, 155).
We can find the historical-structural link be-
tween the rise of large-scale mining in Latin 
America and the colonial condition of the region 
in relation to the world system. Such coloniality 
refers to the ‘exploitation and degradation of both 
nature and people’. Mining revenue was with-
drawn from the region to serve national purpose 
that rarely translated into local advancement. Thus 
regions such as Uyuni show markedly lower so-
cial development than the metropolitan areas of 
these countries (Alimonda: 159–160).
Finally he concludes that Latin America’s 
mining enclaves are based on sharp asymmetries 
of political and economic power in which local 
residents are habitual victims. Here, ‘modernity’ 
and ‘coloniality’ collide as state-of-the-art mining 
refashions nature, dispossesses people and in-
scribes new territorialities in a neoliberal idioms. 
No wonder that mining is a regional ‘flashpoint’, 
as local groups and their national and international 
supporters fight mega-projects that violate human 
rights and democratic principles. This dynamic 
of control and resistance has deep roots in Lain 
American history (Alimonda: 160; Böhm).
In short, the mining industry and the indul-
gent response to harmful exploitation lead to the 
contamination of water, air, animal and plant life 
and even serious health problems for workers and 
local communities. This is a current example of 
human rights violations in the context of transna-
tional business activities in Latin America.
VI. Conclusion
The Salar de Uyuni and surrounding region 
is rich in animal, bird, and vegetative life. Nearly 
all of the local plants are still used by communi-
ties for medicinal purposes. The Salar is home to 
three of the six flamingo species in the world and 
serves as their breeding ground during flood sea-
son. Due to the importance of the Salar watershed 
for human and animal life, it is protected by the 
RAMSAR Convention, an international treaty for 
the conservation of wetlands. The delta of the Rio 
Grande, the drainage from which is crucial for the 
Salar’s regeneration, has already been classified as 
one of 34 global biodiversity Hot Spots by Con-
servation International. This delta forms a year-
round lagoon, used by birds as well as wild and 
domestic animals (Hollender et al.: 41).
All of this could be thrown into environmental 
disarray by a large scale, water-using, industrial 
project in the region. Industrialization plans of 
lithium for the region will stress an already over-
tapped supply of water. It is certain that increased 
water scarcity in the region will have an impact on 
the people who live there and on their ability to 
continue working, farming and living in the region 
(Hollender et al.: 41, 51)
In conclusion, although the ecosystem as a 
whole has already been contaminated and will 
be more and more degraded and destroyed, the 
government pays far too little heed to the warn-
ings raised about serious environmental damages 
at the Salar de Uyuni and its surroundings. If we 
continue to be in chase of lithium wealth, Bolivia 
will end up destroying its entire ecosystem. Strug-
gles for justice in Bolivia are far from over, and 
its efforts to construct more equitable political, 
economic and social systems must involve more 
inclusive forms of social organization, not just in 
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the formal politics but within civil society.
[Notes]
1) This paper is based on the paper titled ‘Lithum Ex-
traction of the Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia: Flora and 
Fauna at Risk with Widespread Pollution’ and pre-
sented at the 17th Annual Conference of the Europe-
an Society of Criminology, 13–16 September 2017, 
Cardiff, United Kingdom.
2) This paper is a part of research results of ‘Research 
on Environmental- and Eco-crimes by Progress of 
Scientific Technologies and Development of Societ-
ies and measures against Them 2015–2019’ (Subject 
Number: 15K03181) supported by the Grant-in-Aid 
of Scientific Research by Japanese Ministry of Edu-
cation, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
3) In order to make a research on current situation of 
lithium extraction and environmental degradation 
at and around the Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia, I vis-
ited the relevant places: the salt plane lake (Uyuni), 
lagoons (Colorada, Honda, and Charkota), lithium 
factories (Rio Grande and Lippi), quinoa farms and 
factory, salt factory (Colchani) , etc. in August 2017.
4) I would like to express my thanks to my colleagues 
for their help: Professor María Laura Böhm (Univer-
sity of Buenos Aires) and members of her research 
group.
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